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Introduction 
Concerns about poverty are at the top of the development agenda 
in many developing, countries. Nowhere m t h e world, is the 
environmental resource base more intensively utilized than in 
Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA). Up to 63 percent of t h e population in 
developing countries is agrarian and pastoral (Dasgupta and M'alet 
1995). In 1998 alone, the share of labour force i n the agricultural 
sector contributed 30 percent of G D P . This is in stark contrast to 
the industrial economies where agriculture contributed only -
percent of G D P and employed only 6 percent o f the labour force. 
A glaring fact is that, for a long time to come, Sub-Saharan Africa 
(SSA) will still be reliant on agriculture. Thus is worrisome because 
the very resource base that provides livelihood is under threat of 
exhaustion from excessive use. 
An emerging issue in the poverty debate is h o w to explain the 
notably close links between poverty and resource degradation'. 
For instance is it forest degradation that causes low agricultural 
productivity, leading to declining labour and capital productivity 
followed by less marketable output and consequently poverty? 
The debate goes even further to focus on ott-iarm costs, including 
downstream flooding, damage to Hydro Elect ric Power (HEP) 
plants, irrigation systems and reduced productivity of coastal 
ecosystems. 
Among the emerging explanations attempting to address the 
phenomenon, is the argument that poverty and resource 
degradation occur in a downward spiral, causing destitution 
(Brundtland Report-WCED 1987). The alternative, and equally 
prominent, school contends that it is the decline in resource base-
quality, associated with institutional factors, that causes poverty. 
They caution against the simplistic linear causality advocated by 
the other school. Their contention is that a complex and intricate 
' The concept o f resource degradation employed in t h - s paper is the decline 
o f renewable resource slocks. 
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web of forces, acting and reinforcing each other, causes resource 
degradation and poverty (J.each and Mearns. 1995). 
We adopt an approach thai emphasizes a specific resource and 
analyzes the human impacts of such utilization {UNEP 1995, 
O E C D 1998). We extend the analysis ro identify the mam agents, 
their economic motivation, and the socio-economic and ecological 
impacts of their actions. This approach allows more insight and 
identification of the complex web of factors in the poverty and 
resource degradation nexus. That is one of the contributions that 
ibis paper will make with reference to forest resource. 
The micro economic causes and effects of resource degradation 
have been studied in a number of settings3. An article by Barret 
(199-1) analyses the impact of pricing and soil conservation eiforts. 
While several studies have provided useful insights on resource 
degradation, ihe links to poverty are yet to be addressed. The 
symbiotic relationship between soil quality and vegetative cover is 
inseparable from the economic malaise of SSA. This lifeline link 
between ecological status and income streams, has also been 
largely ignored in many studies. 
The purpose of this paper is to develop a household model that 
will predict changes in well being, in response to changes in stocks 
ol forest or natural capital. We borrow from economic theory in 
anal/sing the optimal patterns of use. This is important becau.se 
any efforts to combat poverty and resource degradation must 
target those variable.1,, through incentives that can alter individual 
behaviour. This paper aims to make a contribution to this end, as 
it simultaneously derives comparative static theoretical results for 
future empirical work. 
Ihe rest of the paper is structured as follows: in the next section 
we teview ihe literal tire on poverty and deforestation. Thereafter, 
; See {Dasgiips a and [ ic.d (1979); B , r re i ( 1 9 9 l j ; B.iiaaci and Plat tea u (1996) 
lor irisi.incc. 
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we explain the theoretical model used to derive the analytical 
results, and finally we give our conclusions. 
2. Previous Studies on Poverty and Resource Degradation 
Nexus 
We postulate a number of causality relationships which have been 
identified in the literature, but for which quantitative empirical 
analysis is sttll lacking. We, thus, highlight five central 
relationships. We begin with the popular notion of poverty-
environment degradation, which states that it is poverty that 
causes environmental degradation. The poor have few alternatives 
other than exploiting the resource base, which is their productive 
asset as well as consumption basket. Consequently, poverty 
induces the poor to overuse the resource base. This is what we call 
f lypothesis One (or 1 11) summarised as: 
HI : Poverty -^Environmental Degradation. 
An emerging argument is that it is poor governance, vested 
interests and bureaucracy in many developing countries that 
causes environmental degradation. The study by Boyce (199-1) 
argues that the combination of greed, power and wealth causes 
environmental degradation. Dasgupta (1993) also alludes to this 
issue when he invokes the link between civil and political liberties 
with well being. When political and civil liberties are extremely 
rare, it is a reflection of deprivation to resources. It is those in 
power and with authority thai take advantage of the lack of civil 
state to gain control of resources. The way this elite class 'grabs' 
public resources is astounding as documented by Bauer (1.981), 
Hancock (1989), Repetto (1988) and Binswanger (1989). The 
misdeeds include outright theft of official aid, subsidized credit 
facilities, misuse of official position to impose producer price 
controls in agriculture, and imposition of trade restrictions. Such 
controls on producer prices and trade create rents, which often 
end up in the hands of those who foster such controls and 
restrictions. All these have painful implications on distribution 
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and poverty and, in a way, erode the resource base of a country. 
This is what we call Hypothesis T w o (or H2) summarised as: 
H2: Greed, Power and Wealth Environmental Degradation 
The third causality relationship identified in the literature is 
marker failure. Very broadly, some authors classify it as the policy 
variable. There are certain government policies that encourage 
environmental degradation.1 Among the issues highlighted include 
the potential detrimental effects of government policies towards 
environmental degradation. Policy distortions, emanating from 
government-supported minimum prices, and input subsidies, are 
likely to increase deforestation, overstocking and soil exhaustion 
among others. All these send the wrong signals to the actors 
concerned. This is what we call Hypothesis Three (or H3) 
summarised as: 
H3: Market failures —> Environmental Degradation 
CI oseiy related to H3, above, is the institutional failure category. 
Until recently, it has been assumed that, environmental problems 
arc largely associated with the failure of market institutions 
(Maier, 1974). Recently, a number of authors have asserted that 
inappropriate government policies are to blame for environmental 
degradation. Unfortunately, most of them brand both 
mechanisms, generally, as institutional failures. However, as has 
been pointed out by Duraiapah (1998), there is need for 
distinction, as they are different particularly from a policy 
perspective. He cites the example of a policy initiative to address 
incorrect price signals {market failure) as being quite different 
from the need to establish and enforce well-defined rights 
See Rinswanger. 11 ( 1 9 9 ! ) Brazilian Policies that Encourage 
Deforestation in the Amazon. World Development \'o\. i 9 8 2 1 - 8 2 9 . 
Pcrssoti. A and Munasighe. M ( 1 9 9 5 ) "Natural Resource Management and 
hcomvny wide Policies in Costa Rica : A C G C Modell ing Approach" The 
II orhl Bunk Economic Review, vol.) 
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(institutional failure). It is on that strength that we have split the 
two in this analysis. 
The importance of security of tenure in the conservation of a 
resource, and the prevention of its degradation, need not be 
emphasised. It is argued that the answer to resource conservation 
lies in formal and individual title to land. This is borne out of the 
erroneous observation that communal tenure institutions are 
associated with open access problems. This is what we call 
Hypothesis Four (or H4) summarised as: 
H4: Institutional Failures Environmental Degradation. 
The other end of the continuum is a relationship that could 
emerge from any of the above-cited relationships H i , H2, H3, and 
H4. For example, out fifth hypothesis, summarised below as H5, 
states that environmental degradation leads to poverty. 
H5: Environmental Degradation —> Poverty 
If H I alone is observed, then poverty-induced environmental 
degradation thesis holds, and it would be prudent to tackle 
environmental protection through poverty mitigating policies. O n 
the other hand, if environmental degradation is caused by IT2, 
then the policies outlined in H I cannot be viable and could lead to 
further degradation, as shown by Binswanger (1989). The study 
demonstrates how, in Braz.il, the exemption from taxation of 
virtually all-agricultural incomes provided incentives for the 
acquisition of forestlands by the higher income groups and for 
deforesting them. However, policy prescription for H2 is difficult 
because of the entrenched interests, and greed, on the part of the 
wealthy. The first attempt would be the adoption of policies, 
which internalize environmental externalities. This, again, is quite 
difficult because of the vested interests. In the long term it is the 
move towards democratization, and the resultant concentration oi 
political and civil rights, that would ameliorate the problem. A 
5 
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second best strategy would be pressure at the international 
market, where most of these commodities are sold. In this case, 
stricter adherence to a standardized polluter-pays principle would 
help. 
In the case of H3 being responsible for degradation, the answer is 
clear-cut. Remove, or correct, all the market failures. This, like H 2 
above, may be difficult to implement, if there are vested interests 
on the part of the policy makers. The other difficulty lies in 
identifying the market distortions themselves. With regard to H4 , 
(institutional failures) the answer is quite similar: correct the 
institutional failure. The difficulties are also along the lines 
outlined in H3. Lastly, in the event of IT5 being the cause of 
environmental degradation, then two situations could emerge. 
The first is that, H i , H2 , H3 , and H4 or, various combinations of 
all of them cause H5. The second is that, the presence of H 5 can 
set into play a H I type of link. 
A number of other interesting situations could also emerge from 
various combinations outlined above. Beginning with an IT1-H5 
linkage, it is possible that that H I causes H4 and the causal link 
ends there. However, there is the possibility that the poverty 
caused by H5 causes more degradation, as has been argued by 
most commentators on the issue. This is the self-reinforcing 
outcome that sets a downward spiral as illustrated by Durning 
(1989). In this situation, the policy measures taken should 
concentrate on eliminating the problem, at source, and this is 
what the advocates-of the Bruntland and the World Bank have in 
mind. 
If, on the other hand, the situation is one of H2 and H5, then 
there may be open conflict, even among the resource users. Once 
the welfare of the powerful and wealthy is tampered with by 
another group, then perhaps internalisation of externalities will 
begin assuming the existence of a strong civil society. In the 
absence of such a society, then anarchy will set in, as has been 
demonstrated by Dixon (1996). The i n t e r e s t i n g issue here is the 
6 
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role of environmental scarcity in promoting resource-based 
conflict. However, this is beyond the scope of this paper and is left 
out as a potential issue for further research. 
Lastly, supposing that there is a situation where all the conditions 
H I , H2, H3 and H4 are present, simultaneously, and combined 
they strengthen H5. The solution to this is extremely difficult and 
not as straight as the others outlined above. For one, we have 
market and institutional failures, power and wealth, and poverty, 
all working on the environment. Policy prescription, at this level, 
may be a tnai-and-error exercise. For example, policies targeted at 
poverty will have limited impact, if the main driving forces of 
environmental degradation (i.e. market and institutional failures) 
power and wealth are still present. Perhaps, this is one reason why 
many efforts targeted at poverty-environmental degradation 
reduction have failed. 
Forestry 
The focus of this paper is not deforestation per se, because 
deforestation may be a necessary condition for economic 
development, but rather, we focus on the rate at which forests are 
removed. The example is given of Sweden that utilized her forest 
resources during the early development stages. What is important, 
however, is that the rate of use should not exceed some threshold 
level which, in turn, would set in motion negative feedbacks. 
These negative feedbacks have implications on the ecological and 
economic systems on which humanity, particularly in developing 
countries, depend. 
Activities that mainly contribute to deforestation 
In the literature on deforestation, three reasons are cited lor the 
destruction of forests m developing countries: (i) the gathering ol 
fuel wood, (it) the conversion of forest and woodland to pasture 
and cropland, and (iii) commercial logging. In all these activities, 
population pressure is cited as an underlying cause, k is often 
argued that, population growth increases the demand for 
fuel wood and timber. Population growth also, by increasing the 
7 
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demand for arable land, encourages the conversion of forests to 
agriculture. 
Large proportions of people (80 per cent) in developing countries 
use fuel wood as their main source of energy. This has been seen as 
the contributory factor to deforestation. In this regard, Southgate 
and Pierce (1988) cite small-scale farmers as the main agent 
responsible for deforestation. Their study estimates that, of the 
17.6 to 19.2 million hectares of forest cleared in the Brazilian 
Amazon, 2 million could be attributed to fuelwood gathering and 
close to 10 million hectares to small-scale farmers alone. Southgate 
(1988) adds another interesting dimension to the debate by arguing 
that population growth was the prime contributor to the 
unsustainable deforestation, especially in tropical Africa and the 
Amazon basin. T h e study also highlights the critical role that 
livestock and agricultural subsidies played in providing incentives 
for deforestation to occur. In a similar fashion, F A O (1993) 
concluded that agricultural expansion, driven by population 
pressure, was the primary force behind tropical deforestation. 
Jamvry (1993), singled out both government policies (need for 
foreign exchange, the need to resettle the landless etc.) and 
population pressure as providing the incentives for people to 
move into these areas and convert large tracts of land into 
agricultural land permanently. An econometric study by Cropper 
and Griffiths (1994) looked at the effect of population pressures on 
deforestation for developing countries covering Africa, Latin 
America and Asia.-The relevant result is that an increase in rural 
population density of 100 persons per 1000 hectares raises the rate 
of deforestation by 0.33 per cent points in Africa. In its 
interpretation of the results, the study argues for the establishment 
of property rights. Such rights are currently not often defined and, 
even where they exist, they are rarely enforced since the private 
cost of deforestation is zero. However, none of these studies 
makes an explicit link between population growth and poverty. 
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There are other proponents that point to logging as the principal 
contributor to unsustainable deforestation. T h e study by Cropper 
and Griffiths (1994) endorses the hypothesis that logging causes 
deforestation since there is a significant correlation between the 
price of wood and the rate of deforestation in Asia and Latin 
America. Reppeio (1990) attributes commercial logging as the 
number one agent for deforestation in tropical forests. T h e same 
sentiments are echoed by Somanathan (1991), who cites 
commercial interests, driven by government policies, as the 
primary incentive for deforestation in the Himalayas. Other 
studies have pointed out that agricultural and livestock rearing is 
the primary force behind deforestation, and that logging has just 
been the catalyst. They further attribute deforestation to the key 
role played by the creation of infrastructure for agriculture and 
livestock rearing. Goodland (1991) cites cattle ranching and 
unplanned settlement as the main causes of deforestation m Brazil. 
It is the logging trails that initially opened up these large tracts of 
forestland to massive deforestation. 
Another interesting explanation for deforestation is provided by 
Davidson (1993) who argues that, many countries, in a bid to 
reduce their foreign debt arrears, implemented policies which first, 
encouraged the felling of trees and later, the cultivation of crops 
meant for the export market. The author attributes close to 50 per 
cent of all deforestation in the tropics to this practice. Jaganathan 
(1989) re-emphasizes the important role played by market failure, 
as a contributory factor to deforestation in Indonesia. The same 
pattern of logging, followed by conversion of the former 
forestland into estates and gardens is found. T h e study, however, 
did not find much correlation between poverty and deforestation, 
and the only time that peasants were involved in unsustainable 
activity was when they tended unproductive land, abandoned by 
previous landlords. Lutz and Daly (1990), who explicitly mention 
that squatters' contribution to deforestation was minima!, 
strongly support this view. They argue that squatters and the poor 
do not have the resources needed for deforestation. The authors 
argue that those involved in deforestation did so with the 
9 
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intention of selling the land to ranch owners later. They singled 
out banana companies, cattle ranchers and logging companies, as 
the prime actors in deforestation in Costa Rica. 
Tabiel summarises the literature reviewed thus far. 
Tabic 1: Summary of Findings of Literature Reviewed 
Enterprise Agent Incentive Motivation Relationship 
Fuel wood Small- Subsistence Insecure land HI 
collection holder rights 
Profits Markets H2, H3 and 
Commercial H4 
Logging Commercial Profits Government 
policies, 
market 
H2, H3 and 
H4 
Agriculture Commercial Profits Government H2, H3 and 
/livestock policies, 
market 
H4 
Pastoral ism Small-
holder 
Subsistence Food 
security 
H I 
Social and Economic Impacts of Deforestation 
In this section, we look at the impacts of the various activities and 
agents particularly, the ways in which they impact on the 
vulnerable in society. There are various social and economic 
impacts of deforestation identified in the literature. They range 
from fuelwoQcl deficits, los§ of watershed protection to soil 
e r o s i o n . 
Fuel wood scarcity 
Fuel wood is the principal source ol energy to over 60 per cent ol 
people in the world today. The primary uses today are space 
heating and cooking. In Kenya alone, over 80 per cent of the 
population ts entirely dependent on fuel wood for cooking. Tolba, 
et ai, (1992) estimated that, in 1980 alone, 1.3 billion people faced 
10 
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fuel wood shortages and the number was bound to increase to 2.7' 
billion by the year 20G0. The implications of this grave scenario 
weigh heavily on the poor, on whom the incidence falls. A 
number of studies, looking at the household time budgets, have 
recently been undertaken. Filmer and Pritchett (1996), using 
Integrated Household data from Pakistan, found that, in times of 
fuel wood scarcity, collection activates consumed a substantial 
proportion of the household's time, accounting for 6.2 per cent of 
household expenditure. 
A rather bizarre finding from the study is that children, especially 
those aged 15 years and above, significantly contributed to 
relieving mothers for other chores by 3.2 hours per child in a 
week. The implication of this finding is that, fuel wood scarcity 
could trigger households to have more children, thereby 
aggravating an already bad situation. The time taken to collect 
firewood increases as the rate ol depletion increases. The longer 
collecting times imply a larger proportion of time being used for 
fuei wood collection, and hence, less time left for economic 
activities. Even though the study is not based on time series data, 
and hence the difficulty in generalising to relate environmental 
degradation to fertility, the writing is on the wall: the correlation 
between large families and poverty needs no explanation. 
Dasgupta (1993), in an attempt to understand the forces 
underlying population growth using economic analysis, found 
that population growth is linked to poverty, gender inequalities, 
the communal responsibility of raising children, and, most 
important in our context, the erosion of the local resource base. 
Dasgupta and Maler (1995) also forcefully argue that children 
augment family income, derived from the exploitation of natural 
resources, such as fuel wood and water. The cost m this case being 
the time required to collect these resources. Both studies, not 
only show the possibility of a positive relationship between rural 
poverty, fertility, and environmental resource base degradation, 
but also go on to add that there are also market and institutional 
failures that contribute to environmental degradation. 
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There are other studies, however, that point to natural resources 
scarcity as imposing a limit on the demand for children. Loughran 
and Pritchett (1999) have recently confirmed a link between 
environmental scarcity and reduced fertility. Their study, using 
cross-sectional data from Nepal, sought to investigate the impact 
of scarcity in firewood and water on demand for children. They 
found that scarcity of these resources reduced the relative value of 
children in resource collection, and went on to conclude that, 
Nepalese households perceive resource scarcity as being 
responsible for increasing the net cost of children. 
Loss of Watershed Protection 
Forests, especially tropical moist forests, serve as important water 
catchment areas and their loss could have adverse implications on 
the water cycle. Salati (1985) estimates that 75 per cent of annual 
rainfall in the Amazon is returned from the forest to the 
atmosphere and loss of this cover could lead to reduced rainfall in 
future. Although the precise relationship between forest cover and 
ram fall is not yet fully understood, Meher-Homji (1986) 
concludes, from a vegetation rainfall's study, covering 29 stations 
for over 100 years that, as a rule, the larger the area of 
deforestation the larger the number of indicators showing a 
decrease in rainfall. Though the study only looked at localized 
effects, we anticipate that, if the impacts were to be globalised, the 
relationship between the hydrologic cycle and forest cover could 
be significant. 
E-yVi'fe'Arf & S^ SD tkat reduced forest cover in the 
highlands and mountains, could result in an increased 
environmental and resource degradation potential, in the lowlands 
and plains. For example, Somonathan (1991) reports that, the 
average area in Uttar Pradesh, in India, subject to flooding has 
increased from 17,000 Km 2 in 1953-65 to 41000 Km2 in 1976-78, 
which he attributes to deforestation in the Himalayas. Vohra 
(1987), 
who found strong correlation between floods and soil 
erosion, supports these sentiments. 
12 
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Increased Soil Erosion 
Jodha (1995) states that, the removal of forest cover reduces 
nutrient supply of organic matter to the arable lands. Repetto 
(1994) estimates that 25 million tons of topsoil is lost annually, 
due to deforestation alone, in India. From an economic 
perspective, that implies a drop in agricultural productivity and, 
invariably, incomes. Even if we were able to increase all other 
variable inputs, like capital and labour, to maintain constant 
yields, the ultimate result is a drop in agricultural productivity, 
because of increased production costs, per unit of output, as a 
result of resource degradation. The problem is aggravated in 
already marginal areas, where the marginal costs of increasing 
yields, by far, outweigh the marginal benefits. This is, especially, 
true of marginal areas of Africa, which also form the communal 
lands that are worst hit, or most threatened, by environmental 
and resource degradation. 
Table 2: Summary oj the Main Impacts and Groups Affected by 
Resource Degradation 
I m p a c t O u t c o m e E c o n o m i c 
Low income 
R e l a t i o n s h i p 
Fuel wood 
deficit 
D r o p in labour 
product iv i ty , 
Increased fert i l i ty, 
increaseci household 
expendi ture 
H I feedback 
Watershed 
loss 
Increased f looding 
potent ia l , disruption 
of hydroiogical cycle 
All groups 
but worst 
hit are the 
low i n c o m e 
H I feedback 
T T T l w ' d b ^ k Soil eros ion Dec l ine in 
agricultural 
product iv i ty , 
reduced incomes, 
malnutr i t ion 
All groups 
but worst 
hit are the 
low i n c o m e 
13 
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From the literature cited thus far, none has quantitatively assessed 
the socio-economic effects of flooding and water shortages across 
the various economic agents (see Table 2). It is, therefore, quite 
difficult to deduce if some income groups of people had been 
pushed into poverty, while others have benefited or, if all had lost. 
This is a gap in the existing studies that needs to be investigated 
Analysis 
The enterprise analysis, in the previous section, identified the 
possible existence of H I , H2, H3 and IT4 relationships being, 
simultaneously, present. Most of these studies, however, were 
neither conclusive enough, about the direction, nor the magnitude 
of the relationships. The magnitude and direction of causality, 
between resource degradation and poverty, remain largely 
unknown. More refined and detailed information of the socio-
economic groups responsible for the environmental degradation, 
as well as their magnitude, could shed more light and guide in the 
design of corrective policy. For example, if HI is the causal link, 
then policy should focus more on poverty alleviation than 
correcting market failure and power and wealth factors. 
The impact analysis, on the other hand, established the H I 
feedback and, probably, H5 links. Again, the literature does not 
give indication of the magnitude and direction of the two links. 
The interesting observation is that, the actions of one individual 
could cause the welfare of another to fall. This implies that a 
Pareto inefficiency exists, that requires immediate redress. 
3. Analytical Model 
T o help fix ideas, we test the H5 hypothesis. We begin with a 
static one shot model of time allocation by a representative 
household^ between various activities. We later extend to a 
dynamic model that incorporates the effects of time. (The 
1 T h e a s s u m p t i o n retained t h r o u g h o u t this analysis is that the h o u s e h o l d 
maximises single prof i t f u n c t i o n . 
14 
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motivation for ihe extension is provided tn ihe next sub-section.) 
The link between agriculture and forest resource extraction is seen 
through the labour-time allocated between these activities, and 
there is the positive externality exerted by forest\ Ibis link is also 
justified from the point of view thai it is the lack of viable 
production activities and lack of properly defined property rights 
that leads to the destruction of the resource base. Each household 
has an endowment of time T t which is allocated among competing 
activities. T h e total amount of revenue received by each 
household, and the amount of time devoted to each activity, 
determine their household income status, via the respective 
production functions. 
Perhaps the starting point is to formalize a relationship between 
deforestation, on one hand, and poverty, prices and tenure 
conditions, on the other. 
Deforestation = f (poverty, prices, security of tenure). 
The "representative" individual makes a decision on how to 
allocate his time among a number of competing economic 
activities. In his production choice set, he has four alternatives: 
• Devote his time IV hours offering labour for a wage or 
engage in other income generating activities, earning at a rate 
w; 
« Use Ta hours to produce food crops, and other goods, for his 
family consumption and sell the surplus at PA net of cost; 
• Spend his time TF hours expanding area or cultivation m the 
forest. There exists a market for the forest product which, in 
our case is charcoal and fencing posts, sold at price Pr; 
• Invest Tf hours in land improvement changes, like terracing, 
fencing or application of manure on his farm. 
1 Soi ls in t r o p i c a l areas o w e their p r o d u c t i v e qual i t ies to die p r o t e c t i v e 
role of forests and h u m u s f r o m d e c o m p o s i n g vegeta t ion . 
15 
IDS H'P 532 
For consumption, the choices he can make are from goods that are 
produced and consumed in the family, goods purchased m the 
market and leisure. 
Formally, the individual's problem is the maximization of total 
revenue from wage employment, agricultural production, and 
sales of forest products subject to the time constraint. 
Max : 7T = vf7; + PAQ(TAJ,a) + P,G(T,.,X) 
(3.1) 
s.t. TV - 1 - TA - TR - TI ; where TV , T»- , TA , TI > 0 
Production of forest and crops is determined as: 
a ) h = h ( T r , X ) 
b)Q = < 2 ( 7 J , a) 
{3.2) 
Where h and Q are production in physical units, X is the forest 
stock, E) represents knowledge in agriculture, I ss the augmentation 
amount, and T is the time spent in each activity. The production 
function (3.1) is assumed concave, with positive but diminishing 
marginal returns for all inputs. All inputs are normal, and any pair 
of inputs are complimentary, (th; > 0 ; iy^j) . 
The Lagrangian associated with this maximization problem is: 
(3.3) 
16 
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At the margin, the marginal benefits, per unit of output, of the 
three activities, should equal the wage rate, or the shadow value of 
time. While not presenting the formal derivation of the 
comparative static results, the effects of the exogenous changes of 
some of the variables in the model are fairly straightforward and 
presented below: 
1. Higher wages from a growing economy would attract people, 
thereby reducing forest dependence and, hence, its degradation. 
2. Higher agricultural prices lead to increased profits and thus 
would increase forest resource destruction since individuals are 
induced to cut down forests, or expand into marginal land, to 
increase the area under crops. 
3. Higher prices for forest products, would lead to more forest 
being destroyed for charcoal and fencing materials. 
4. Relative profitability determined by higher output prices or 
increasing technological progress will increase relative profitability 
of agriculture and land under agriculture. 
5. Increased augmentation, assuming that complimentarity with 
labour, increases output. 
The Dynamic Mode! 
We extend the previous static model by including time. A static 
model neither captures the impact of time on deforestation nor its 
effects on income streams and, invariably, poverty. An inter-
temporal dimension of deforestation, on incomes and other 
decision parameters, is something that has either only been 
mentioned or hinted at in the literature. An awareness of the 
differences, in timing, between deforestation and incomes is a 
desirable first step. How exactly does the timing of deforestation 
influence crop production and, consequently, incomes? This 
question deserves a more structured approach than has heretofore 
been taken. 
T h e optimal control theory suggests a framework that may serve 
this purpose. T h e model suggested is essentially a mirror image of 
a capital investment model, applied to a dynamic choice model of 
labour allocation on forestry activities. W e have argued that stocks 
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of forest do impose a positive externality on crop production and 
that any decline in productivity can be attributed to declining 
stocks of forest. On site, soil loss, due to deforestation, causes a 
decline in crop growth, resulting in reduced future productivity. 
Over time, this loss leads to declining incomes and consequently, 
loss of command over market goods and services. By assuming the 
planning horizon to be infinite, this inter-temporal effect on 
poverty is incorporated. The inclusion of off-site effects is 
obviously a difficult problem in optimal resource management. 
Recent advances in non-market valuation methodology offer 
promise in estimating the offsite damages and incorporation in the 
objective function. However, that task is not undertaken here. 
The model 
The household's problem is to maximize revenues from crop 
production and forest extraction, less amounts spent on 
augmentation0. Correspondingly, the model has one state variable: 
the forest stock (X), measured in total hectares. The state equation 
represents the growth rate of forest and its harvest by the 
households. It is this harvest that constrains the output from 
agriculture. X (t) is forest stock at any point in time, X ( t ) > 0 , 
initial stock size X ( 0 ) > 0 . The standard growth function for 
aggregate forest biomass, when no harvest takes place is given by: 
x = F (( X I r , K ) 
u J f 7 (3.4) 
Where: X is the intrinsic growth of forest btomass; K is the 
carrying capacity; and, F (X) is the growth of biomass and is noh 
negative, for 0 < X < K. 
The explicit function could be to assume a logistic growth 
function as follows: 
& N o t e that d r o p p i n g wage e m p l o y m e n t a r g u m e n t in the o b j e c t i v e 
f u n c t i o n does n o t change o u r k e y results. 
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We adopt a, slightly, different notation to incorporate time as a 
continuous variable. We write Ta and Tr as L, m continuous time. 
Hence H~H{'T}:>X) is the same as H — H(IYX) and 
0 = Q(7\ , / , # ) is Q = 0{iQ , 7 , a ) in continuous time. Note 
that ihe household allocates its labour bciween farming and forest 
extraction activities only. Crop production is given by: 
Where: Q is output at any point in time and is measured in 
output per hectare; Q is a coefficient representing knowledge of 
agricultural techniques; I is the amount of augmentation effort 
(e.g. quantity of fertilizer applied or length ol bunds built); and, L 
0 is an interaction variable between labour time and knowledge in 
crop production. 
The partial derivatives with respect to the arguments are as 
follows; 
o , „ > 0 , 0 , „ , . „ < 0 , 0 , > 0 , Q „ < 0 , e , „ , > 
o , 0 O > 0,£>,„ < 0 ,QALA > 0 ,QAL > 0. 
We further assume that, the crop production function is concave, 
continuous and twice differentiate, in Lii and / such 
that Q/a{aQ/{ ~ Q2 i.aia > 0 . There is no hired labour; the 
household uses its own labour (see footnote 6). 
Forest harvest is given by: h (t) = h (X, L) measured in bags of 
charcoal or number of posts. The partial derivatives, with respect 
to the variables, are; 
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hx > 0 , h x x < 0 , h L > 0 , h u < 0 , h L X < 0 
The last cross parciai derivative implies that declining stocks of 
forest have negative impact on the marginal productivity of 
labour. Labour has to travel longer distances in search of forest 
resources. 
Harvest, at any point in time, is given by h (t), which is an 
increasing function of labour and forest stocks, but subject to 
diminishing returns. 
Household revenue at any point in time is given by: 
(Q{LA J,CC)-PJL + P, (H(X,L)) (3.4) 
where, PA is the output price of agricultural output, PY is price of 
market charcoal or other forest products and P{ is the price of 
purchased inputs. T h e current flow of revenue, Y , is gotten from 
sales of agricultural produce and forest extraction products. The 
stocks of forest are given at the initial dates; the control variables 
are L, X and 1. T h e objective is to maximize the discounted sum 
of the flow of aggregate revenue over the indefinite future. 
Formally, the household's maximization problem is given as: 
[ Y e ~ * d t (3.5) 
Where, 0 > 0 
A1, = F{X,y,K) ~h(X,L) 
A ' ( 0 ) - X 0 O ' 6 ) 
The current Hamiltonian value associated with our maximization 
problem is written as; 
(3.7) 
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0 Is the cosisie variable associated with the maximization problem, 
h indicates the shadow price of forest stock. Recall that the theory 
of optimum control instructs us to choose the control variables at 
each date so as to maximize equation (3.7). The first order 
necessary' conditions to the problem are written as: 
i ) d H / d I = PAQ}-P,= 0 
i i ) d H 4 t = + p > - h ' - + = 0 
III)X = F{X,V,K)-h(X,L) 
IV)A - 3A - ~(P!HX + A.(FX - HX ) 
Transversa lily conditions 
v)X{0)= XO,a{T)>0 
vi)X(T) > 0 , A ( D X ( T ) = 0 
(3.8) 
The second order condition holds if our Hamiltonian is concave; 
H t l H u - ( H n ) 2 > 0 
Interpretation of the first order necessary conditio?is 
Interpretation of the necessary conditions is a routine matter. 
Equation (;) equates marginal benefit of an incremental increase in 
purchased inputs to the price of inputs. Equation (ii) equates 
marginal benefits of labour input, in forest extraction, to its 
marginal cost. It has two components: a forgone marginal benefit 
( ? Qf a ) n 0 L employing labour in agriculture and Ohi., which is 
the opportunity cost of harvesting the resource today, as opposed 
to keeping it for future use. The equation also suggests 
that (7^.- — X)hj ~FAQla>0t with the implication that the 
shadow price of forest resource stock must be less than the price 
of the forest product. P-r should compensate both for the forgone 
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agricultural income, due to the allocation of labour to forestry and 
the forgone benefits from not conserving the forest for the next 
Equation (iii) is the resource constraint, showing how the resource 
stocks change over time. Rearranging equation (iv) 
yields 8/i ~ A + Xhx = P,.hx + A,F ^ . The R H S is the benefit 
from harvesting, which comprises of two components; the direct 
benefits from harvesting in the current period ( P , . h K ) and the 
indirect benefit from incremental growth of mocks A.F\.. The 0 is 
a price that converts the growth of forest stocks into money. The 
LHS term has three terms, 8X is the interest earned, if the capital 
had been invested in alternative investments, X is the capital gains 
term and Ahx is the value of forgone benefits of future harvest. 
4.0 Comparative Statics 
We linnearise the equations in (3.8) and rearrange them to form a 
matrix B, which, we assume, is nonsingular and, therefore, has a 
determinant j ^ j . Recall that, the vector of exogenous parameters 
include: PU, Pp, PI, D and D. We analyse the probable impact of a 
change in the exogenous parameters on the control variables. 
(4.4 
period. 
c U / (4.3) 
dl/ 
;dA^PhOUa \B 
>0 (4.5) 
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Similarly we could work out other comparative statics with 
respect to other control variables of interest. 
d¥dp^P,Q„Q„„0, /|B|<0 (4.6) 
d y d P (4.7) 
d y d P i = P , Q l , j \ B \ > 0 (4.8) 
dL/da = < P * ? Q » Q x « - P j Q m & M < 0 (4-9) 
d L / . a = PA0,,h, < 0 (4.10) 
implications from the comparat ive statics 
Intuitively, labour allocation to forest extraction and agriculture, 
suggests that an increase m price oi agricultural production will 
increase the use of purchased input, whereas an increase in price of 
forest product will reduce purchased input use. Increasing 
attractiveness of forest products implies a reduction of {arming 
activity, A h i g h e r / . , (shadow price of forest biomass) increases 
the opportunity cost of deforestation and, therefore, reduces the 
labour time allocated to forest extraction. T h e surplus labour 
released from deforestation activities can be transferred to 
agriculture. Pol icy should be directed at diverting labour away 
from forest extraction. 
An increase in the price of agricultural output leads to a higher 
labour allocation in agriculture, thus reducing labour use in lorest 
extraction, and vice versa. An increase in agricultural input prices 
makes farming less intensive and leads to increased labour 
allocation to forestry. Improved knowledge of farming techniques 
leads to a shift in labour allocation from forest to farming. Finally, 
a higher shadow price of forest resource stock increases the 
opportunity cost of forest extraction, so that the household 
allocates less labour to forest extraction activities. 
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5. Conclusion 
This paper surveys existing literature on poverty and deforestation 
and attempts to provide understanding to the links from a socio-
economic and ecological perspective. The dynamic model 
reported is directed towards policy and empirical application. The 
model seeks to show the changes in income streams, over tune, 
attributable to changes in forest stocks. The decline in ecological 
services offered by forests, contributes to the decline in crop 
productivity and, consequently, output. This invariably leads to a 
decline in income and the resultant command for market goods 
and sendees. The household allocates labor to various activities, 
based on relative profitability. A change in certain exogenous 
variables, like prices, can influence labor allocation in favour of 
forest preservation. Whether the results hold, however, is an 
empirical question. 
Possible problems 
The ultimate goal of this paper is to empirically test the 
hypotheses derived therein for Kenya, However, the 
implementation of such a study faces some challenges. First, is the 
availability and quality of time series or panel data. Most of the 
data available covers national level, yet factors causing 
deforestation are relatively location-specific. Secondly, the 
problem as formulated is within a partial equilibrium framework. 
The risk with that is the failure to capture other important factors 
that influence the problem at hand. There is also a limitation 
imposed by the forest model: it does not fully capture the 
dynamics of forest growth. 
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